Motivations
In the last two decades Italy registered notable improvements in the functioning of labour market.
Such improvements in labour market performance seem to have been accompanied with a deterioration in terms of productivity and competitiveness Are the reforms in labour market responsible for both a better functioning labour market on the one side and a poor performance in terms of productivity and competitiveness on the other?
Theoretical considerations
• Labour market institutions and productivity:
-Employment protection o More stringent EPL is an obstacle to the reallocation of workers and jobs across firms and sectors, reduce the propensity to undertake risky activities, reduce workers' effort; o On the other hand EPL may promote specific investment and result in more learning by doing with a positive effect on productivity o Partial EPL reform via the introduction of temporary contracts has an ambiguous effect on productivity depending on the reasons why firms employ temporary workers rather than permanent workers Theoretical considerations
-Wage Bargaining setting o More centralized/coordinated wage-bargaining systems reduce the responsiveness of industry and firm-level wages to sectoral price and productivity developments (Holmlund and Zetterberg, 1991; Teulings and Hartog, 1998 ) with a negative effect on allocative efficiency o In decentralized wage-bargaining regimes, incentives to innovate and adopt new technologies depend crucially on workers' bargaining power. The risk of hold-up can be partly mitigated when bargaining occurs at the national level (or at the industry level but with economy-wide co-ordination) and sets the general frame of the wage schedule. (Teulings and Hartog, 1998 • Labour market effects of the reforms:
-More "numerical flexibility" with a steadily increase in the number of temporary forms of employment -Wage moderation (decentralized wage bargained was very limited, however a change in the industrial relations environment led to period of "institutional" wage moderation)
• Decomposition of aggregate labour productivity growth (Foster, Haltiwanger, and Krizan, 2001) Decomposition labour productivity growth 1980-1987 1988-1993 1994-2001 2001-2008 Measurement and empirical strategy
Step 1: assess the effect of reforms on the within component (sector labour productivity)
-Rajan and Zingales (1998) methodology: the amount of regulation changes over time and is given for all sectors but its impact could be different according to some sectoral characteristics which influences the frequency of labour adjustments Y jt = productivity of sector j Z t = labour market institution indexes (EPL, CE and CO indices) sec j = sector characteristics (manufacturing, intrinsic JR, human capital endowment) X it = sector-level control variables Measurement and empirical strategy Sectoral intrinsic need for JR: job turnover and excess job turnover calculated at sectoral level using data from an economy with a deregulated labour market (UK)
γ gives the change in the difference in productivity between high and low reallocation industries (10th and 90th percentile for example) originated by a change in the institutional variable.
In our sample sectors at the 10th and 90th percentile of intrinsic reallocation are "Transport, storage and communication" and "Manufacture of electrical and optical equipment" respectively
Step 2: assess the effect of reforms on the reallocation effect -Following Brown and Earle (2004, 2006 ) methodology, we can express the reallocative effect as a covariance, namely: -β is the responsiveness of the sector size to its relative performance -The responsiveness is measured in terms of its contribution to the aggregate productivity growth -We express β as a function of institutional indices and other sector specific variables in order to capture the impact of changes in labour market institutions on the extent of productivity-enhancing reallocation as follow 
